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JANICKE RASMUSSEN 
Do Board Evaluation Measure Board Effectiveness?                                       
The Case of Large Listed Companies in Norway 
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to assess to what extent implemented board evaluation 
processes in Norwegian listed companies have contribute to the board’s effectiveness.  Board 
effectiveness has been measured by using three levels of accountability, namely, board 
performance, conformance to content, and conformance to context. Multiple case studies 
were performed in nine large listed companies using the board evaluation process as the unit 
of analysis. The characteristics of the implemented board evaluation process were compared 
and contrasted with the characteristics of the board evaluation process identified in the 
literature. From a value creation perspective, the implemented board evaluations appeared to 
represent value creation for the board members rather than measuring board effectiveness. 
_______________________________________---- 
Janicke Rasmussen, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the BI Norwegian School of Business, 
Department of Accounting – Auditing and Law, Nydalsveien 37, 0484 Oslo, Norway, Email: 
janicke.rasmussen@bi.no, Tel. +4746410433, Fax. +4723264793. 
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The increased demand and pressure on boards with regard to accountability issues has been 
evident in Codes for Practice of Corporate Governance, nationally and internationally 
(Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007). One recommended action is that boards should 
perform an evaluation of their work. Although board evaluations are viewed as a recent 
development, they have been part of the corporate governance discussion over the last two 
decades. Most prevailing European Codes developed for listed companies recommend that 
board evaluations are performed, including the Norwegian Code for Practice of Corporate 
Governance for listed companies in Norway (Norwegian Code), stating that “the board should 
evaluate its performance and expertise annually”(NUES 2012:34) . In a corporate governance 
context, an evaluation will enable the board to assess actual performance against a set 
standard, and if actual performance deviates from a set standard, corrective actions may be 
taken. Thus, board evaluations are viewed as  important in terms of assessing the 
effectiveness of boards (Ingley and van der Walt 2002, 2005, Leblanc 2005, Leblanc and 
Schwartz 2007, Long 2006, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007, Gabrielsson and Huse 
2004, Kiel and Nicholson 2005). However, no research has been conducted to see if board 
evaluations actually measure board effectiveness. 
In this article, accountability is used to conceptualize if board 
evaluations measure board effectiveness, applying general theories, board role 
theories and behavioral theories for creating accountability (Roberts, McNulty, 
and Stiles 2005). Accountability and value creation are treated as synonyms 
assuming that the purpose of any board is to contribute to value creation. 
Different levels of board effectiveness have been identified by applying the 
question of “value creation for whom?” 
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The Norwegian corporate governance system regarding boards of 
directors assumes a stakeholder approach to boards and governance (Ees, 
Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009), given corporate co-determination through 
corporate assemblies, employee elected directors, and regulations regarding 
gender balance in the board (Rasmussen and Huse 2011).  The Norwegian 
Code uses a stakeholder approach in explaining the purpose of the Code, 
“ensuring the greatest possible value creation over time in the best interest of 
shareholders, employees and other stakeholders” (NUES 2012:6) , but is 
developed by investor and shareholder groups and assumed to have a strong 
investor perspective (Rasmussen and Huse 2011).  
A unitary and balancing firm internal or firm external perspective on boards and value 
creation, as discussed in Huse and Gabrielsson (2012) and Huse (2007), was used to identify 
different levels of board effectiveness. The highest level -- board performance -- uses 
balancing and firm internal perspectives on boards and value creation, assuming board 
commitment should be to create value for the firm, a perspective which may be traced back to 
the resource dependency theory and the team production theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
Blair and Stout 1999). 
A lower level of board effectiveness, conformance to content,  uses a unitary and firm 
external perspective on value creation--value creation for external stakeholders/owners -- 
(Huse and Gabrielsson 2012) identifying  expectations regarding boards in the Norwegian 
Code. The lowest level, conformance to context, uses a unitary and firm internal perspective 
on value creation—value creation for boards. In this context; performing any board 
evaluation is considered to be a measure of board effectiveness. Given the lack of empirical 
research, the conceptual literature on board evaluation was used to identify characteristics of a 
board evaluation process that could measure board effectiveness. Through multiple case 
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studies in nine of the largest listed Norwegian companies in terms of market capitalization, 
and using the board evaluation process as the unit of analysis, it was possible to compare  the 
implemented board evaluation process to the indicators of a board evaluation process 
measuring board effectiveness as identified in the literature. 
The research shows that board evaluation in large Norwegian listed companies is 
performed to conform to context as a consequence of the recommendation in the Norwegian 
Code. Although evaluation to conform to context represents a certain level of board 
effectiveness, the data indicate that the implemented process is more likely to represent value 
creation for boards and board members, given that boards’ performing evaluations are 
perceived as professional. 
Although the research should be understood in a Norwegian context it should add to 
the literature on board effectiveness, using accountability as a construct. Additionally, the 
study should add to the literature on behavioral aspects of boards. Practically, the research 
may help boards in designing board evaluation processes that can measure board 
effectiveness, or it can be used in developing future Codes. The article starts by defining 
board evaluations and presenting the rationale for them. Then board evaluation as a 
mechanism to assess board effectiveness is presented, building on previous research on board 
effectiveness that identified the link between board effectiveness and accountability. 
Propositions are presented and explained through the existing literature on board evaluation 
processes, followed by a presentation of the methodology, before the findings are discussed 
and conclusions made. The article ends with a few suggestions for future research. 
The European Code 
As early as 1994, The Blue Ribbon Commission published the report, “Performance 
Evaluation of CEOs, Boards and Directors, followed by the report, “Board evaluation: 
Improving Director effectiveness” in 2000 (Long 2006). Most European Codes recommend 
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that board evaluations are performed (Rasmussen 2008).  Studies of listed companies in 13 
European countries in 2009 show that, on average, 75 percent of boards conduct board 
evaluations.  Studies in Norway confirm these findings, concluding that 73 percent of 
Norwegian listed companies perform board evaluations, but the level of transparency was 
extremely low (Rasmussen 2010).  
Board evaluations: Definition and rationale 
Board evaluations are defined as evaluations where the boards as a whole, or the individual 
directors, are evaluated. They can be performed by the board itself or by someone on behalf 
of the board (Kiel and Nicholson 2005, Leblanc 2005, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 
2007). In a corporate governance context, board evaluation is about assessing boards’ work.  
General theories and board role theories can explain what boards do, while behavioral 
theories may explain how boards work. From the perspective of board role theories and 
general theories, different tasks have been identified as important for boards to be engaged in. 
The different roles and tasks vary as a consequence of the focus these theories have on “value 
creation for whom”.  Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983),   
focuses on various control tasks, applying a firm external perspective and ensuring value 
creation for external stakeholders/owners. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978, Huse and Gabrielsson 2012), and team production theory (Blair and Stout 1999, 
Kaufman and Englander 2005, Gabrielsson, Huse, and Minichilli 2007, Huse and Gabrielsson 
2012) use a firm internal and balancing perspective where boards are engaged in tasks related 
to providing service and knowledge to the company and creating value for the firm.  
Institutional theory, interlocking theory, and class hegemony theory explain the role and tasks 
of boards from a firm internal and unitary perspective, focusing on value creation for internal 
actors and business elites (Huse 2007).  Given that boards perform various tasks, and that 
board evaluations are about aligning actual and expected task performance, a pluralistic view 
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on board tasks is applied.  If the rationale for recommending board evaluation  is based on 
their ability to measure board effectiveness (Levrau and Van den Berghe 2007) , the question  
is, what is board effectiveness and how can it be measured? 
Much of previous research focuses on board composition and structure as input to 
board effectiveness, using financial indicators as proxy.  The limitation of these studies is that 
they measure board effectiveness based on a board’s form, not performance.  Other researches 
use board processes to measure company performance, focusing on the role of the board in 
terms of tasks and purposes (Zahra and Pearce Ii 1989, Forbes and Milliken 1999, Carpenter 
and Westphal 2001, Hillman and Dalziel 2003, Nicholson and Kiel 2004), arguing that, while 
board structure conditions board effectiveness,  the behavioral dynamics of a boards, and the 
relationship between the board members   determine board effectiveness (Roberts, McNulty, 
and Stiles 2005). The pluralistic approach in these studies is the same as here, arguing that 
this is important to fully comprehend board behavior. 
Literature discussing board evaluation identifies the rationale for introducing board 
evaluation in terms of increased accountability, defined as “doing what you are supposed to 
do” (Huse 2007:35). It is argued that demand for increased accountability was initiated by 
shareholder activism (Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007, Long 2006, Van der Walt and 
Ingley 2001) , where shareholders demanded that boards demonstrate leadership and control 
(Kiel and Nicholson 2005).  Others argue that, in general, external participants such as 
institutional investors, regulators and others, are the driving forces behind  the introduction of 
board evaluation (Kiel and Nicholson 2005, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007) .   
The concept of accountability and value creation is often explained within the context 
of board role theories (Huse 2005), where  Agency Theory (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), Stewardship Theory (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997, Stiles 
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and Taylor 2001), Stakeholder Theory (Freeman 1984), and Resource Dependency Theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), have been used to explain the roles of boards and the tasks they 
perform. Within this context, board effectiveness is achieved if expected and actual task align. 
However, given the pluralistic approach adopted in this research, expected board performance 
has been identified through different perspectives on value creation and accountability (Huse 
2005), identifying three levels of board effectiveness: board performance, conformance to 
content, and conformance to context, as illustrated  in Figure 1. 
Insert figure 1: Three levels of board effectiveness 
Board performance uses balancing and firm internal perspectives on boards and value 
creation-- boards should do what is best for the firm-- balancing the expectations of all 
stakeholders. Conformance to content uses unitary and firm external perspective on value 
creation; boards should do what is best for owner, identified in the Norwegian Code regarding 
boards’ work.  Conformance to context uses a unitary, firm internal perspective on value 
creation, indicating that board evaluations are performed by the board because it is expected. 
However, this level of board effectiveness is identified based on the assumption that board 
evaluations do not have a negative effect on board effectiveness.   
Applying this to the concept of board evaluation enables to link board accountability with 
board effectiveness by assuming that actual task performance can be compared to expected 
task performance to determine effectiveness (Huse 2007). 
This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Insert figure 2 about here  
Figure 2 shows that expected task performance is linked to actual task performance 
through board composition, structure, tasks and processes, all influencing actual task 
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performance. Board evaluation links actual and expected task performance and may be used 
to measure if the two align. Based on this, three propositions can be presented: 
Proposition 1: Board evaluations in Norwegian listed companies are conducted to 
assess board performance and are a measure of value creation for the firm 
Proposition 2: Board evaluations in Norwegian listed companies are performed to 
conform to content, and are a measure of value creation for external stakeholders 
identified in the Norwegian Code 
Proposition 3: Board evaluations in Norwegian listed companies are performed to 
conform to context, and are a measure of value creation for the board. 
 
Given the lack of empirical research, the conceptual literature on board evaluation was 
used to build a framework for collecting and analyzing data, and through this the elements of 
a board evaluation process were identified (Rasmussen 2010). They are presented in Figure 3.  
Insert figure 3 about here. 
 
Factors influencing the decision to conduct a board evaluation 
The main focus in the literature is on the benefit of board evaluations, arguing that board 
evaluations can clarify individual and collective roles and responsibilities (Graf 2007, Conger, 
Finegold, and Lawler 1998, Leblanc 2005, Kazanjian 2000, Julien and Rieger 2003), improve  
relationships between  board and management (Conger, Finegold, and Lawler 1998), improve 
decision-making, enhance  communication and operation, and improve  leadership and 
teamwork (Long 2006). The literature focuses less on rationale for initiating board evaluation. 
Cadbury addresses the moral issue of conducting board evaluations “to maintain their 
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competitive edge and to meet the expectations of investors” (Cadbury 2002:44), while Huse 
and Gabrielsson (2012) identify the rationale  related to value creation and transparency, 
arguing that board evaluations may “help aligning board task expectations and board task 
performance, and, in a transparency context, develop trusting relations between the board and 
important actors” (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012:245) 
Although it is not possible to say that board evaluations implemented as a 
consequence of recommendation cannot assess board performance, it is possible to assume 
that, as a consequence of the recommendation in the Norwegian Code, board evaluations are 
performed to meet the expectations of certain actors. Further, if the frequency of board 
evaluations aligns with what is recommended by the Norwegian Code, this indicates that 
board evaluations are performed to conform to context or content. 
Conducting the board evaluation 
To the extent purpose is discussed, it is related to the importance of setting a purpose, 
enabling the board to decide on objectives against which the board can be measured (Conger, 
Finegold, and Lawler 1998, Conger 2002, Huse and Gabrielsson 2012) . Deciding on a 
purpose is important in order to identify  relevant expectations, but  also in terms of 
developing a process that will contribute to the purpose being  achieved, conditioning who 
should be in charge of the process, the content,  methods, and how to report on the results 
(Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007, Kiel and Nicholson 2005). Minichilli et al (2007) 
categorize purposes as external if they are meant to satisfy external requirements such as the 
Codes, and internal if they relate to changing the conduct and behavior of the board in 
performing its work. Based on this categorization, some indicators of a board evaluation 
process that enable board effectiveness to be measured can be identified.  If no purpose has 
been established or expectations identified, the possibility to compare actual to expected 
performance is eliminated, indicating that board evaluation is performed to conform to 
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context;  If the identified purpose and expectations satisfy external requirements, this 
indicates that board evaluation is performed to conform to content;  If the identified purpose 
and expectations satisfy all important stakeholders, this indicates that board evaluations are 
performed to assess board performance.  
Object of the board evaluation 
The rationale behind evaluation of the board collectively is that it is the board as a group that 
will have the greatest possibility to influence board effectiveness (Cadbury 2002). Research 
on team effectiveness supports this argument (Conger 2002). The literature discussing 
evaluation of individual directors agrees that board effectiveness cannot be addressed 
thoroughly without evaluating individual board members (Hoffman 2003, Conger 2002, 
Leblanc 2009, Kiel and Nicholson 2005, Leblanc 2005). The Norwegian Code recommends 
that board evaluations should include boards collectively, as well as individual directors 
(NUES 2012). Evaluation where boards collectively and individually are the object indicates 
that evaluation is performed to conform to the content or to   assess board performance. If the 
object of the board evaluation is the board collectively, this indicates that board evaluations 
are performed to conform to context. 
Content of the board evaluation 
Kiel and Nicholson (2005) and Minichilli et al (2007) stress the importance of content, 
addressing the core issues of the board evaluation, the identified purpose. Most  literature 
addressing content  discusses it without discussing the purpose, although the importance of 
having something to compare actual board performance against is stressed (Shultz 2009). 
Some literature suggests the use of existing frameworks when deciding on the content of the 
board evaluation, such as best practice as represented by the different Codes, guidelines 
developed by specific companies (Ingley and van der Walt 2002),  balanced scorecards or 
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guidelines developed by specific professional bodies (Leblanc 2005, Kiel and Nicholson 
2005).  
Huse and Gabrielsson  suggest that the content should be developed as a consequence 
of the purpose and within a value creation context,  using different dimensions on board 
effectiveness, such as: “board tasks, board member and composition, board room culture, 
board- CEO relationship, board leadership,” etc. (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012:246). This 
suggestion may indicate to the following indications of board effectiveness: If the content of 
the board evaluation has been developed as a consequence of the purpose, board evaluation is 
performed to assess board performance, or to conform to content. If no link exists between 
purpose and content, evaluations are performed to conform to context. 
The evaluator  
The general view in the literature is that the choice of evaluator should be based on criteria 
identified as important for objectivity (Garratt 1997, Kazanjian 2000, Steinberg 2000, Shultz 
2009). Others argue that more subjective criteria should be used when deciding on the 
evaluator, such as the company’s need for transparency and accountability (Kiel and 
Nicholson 2005, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007). If a clear purpose of the board 
evaluation exists, the use of an external evaluator might indicate that objectivity is important, 
suggesting that board evaluations are performed to assess board performance or conform to 
content. If no clear purpose exists, the use of an external evaluator indicates evaluation is 
performed to conform to content or context. The combination of internal evaluator and no 
clear purpose indicates that evaluations are performed to conform to context. 
Modality of the board evaluation 
Modality means either how evaluations are performed or methods used. Evaluations can take 
the form of self-evaluations, peer-evaluations, or evaluation by management, all characterized 
as internal approaches. Evaluation can be performed by externals, such as the Nomination 
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Committee, the share market, or other stakeholders (Huse, Minichilli, and Schøning 2005, 
Kiel and Nicholson 2005, Stein and Hewett 2008, Conger 2002, Sroufe and Naficy 2005, 
Hoffman 2003, Graf 2007, Nadler, Behan, and Nadler 2006, Montgomery and Kaufman 
2003).  It is argued that the use of internal approaches is useful when boards want to assess 
board processes, given issues like confidentiality (Minichilli et al 2007). Thus, an internal 
approach would indicate assessment of board performance, and an external approach 
conformance to content or context.  
Available methods of board’s performance assessment are surveys, interviews, document 
analysis and participant observation.  Minichilli (2007) argues that interviews and participant 
observations are useful if one wants to investigate board processes, indicating that   these 
methods are linked to assessment of board performance. The literature identifies survey as the 
most common method, offering several advantages with the method, such as  possibility for 
comparing results between individuals  from year to year, for benchmarking and for 
comparison against codes for practice (Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007, Kiel and 
Nicholson 2005, Shultz 2009), thus assuming this method may be linked to all levels of 
assessment.  In order to conclude on level of effectiveness, modality must be viewed together 
with other elements of board evaluations process. 
Follow-up 
Although there are some comments in the literature regarding the importance of results being 
materialized into an action plan (Sroufe and Naficy 2005, Leblanc 2009, Stein and Hewett 
2008), they are not specific about the content of this action plan, and who should be 
responsible for it. Leblanc (2005) argues that any follow-up should be an integrated part of   a 
development program for the board, its committees and individual directors. Based on this, 
follow-up procedures should be identified if evaluations are performed to assess board 
performance or conform to content, assuming gaps between expected and actual performance 
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exist. No follow-up procedure indicates that board evaluations are performed to conform to 
context. 
Methods 
The pluralistic approach adopted in the research is based on its ability to provide explanation 
about board evaluations as a mechanism to assess board effectiveness. The main method is 
multiple case studies of nine large listed companies in Norway. The decision to use multiple-
case studies was based on the ability they give to gain a rich understanding of the context of 
the research and processes that are being enacted and the possibility they give to compare and 
generalize (Morris and Wood 1991). The fact that boards are deviant, in terms of size, 
experience, background and the tasks they perform, adds to the possibility to generalize.  The 
board evaluation process is the unit of analysis, and primary data were collected through 
interviews, using a standardized open-ended questionnaire to interview on average three 
board members in each company.   
A non-probability sampling method was chosen; using the twenty one largest listed 
Norwegian companies based on market capitalization as of December 31st 2007 as sampling 
frame. The decision was based on the assumption that larger companies have greater 
motivation than smaller companies to comply with the Norwegian Code, given dispersed 
ownership, higher liquidity in the share, and greater attention by financial analysts. As 
indicated in the annual report of these companies, sixteen had performed a board evaluation in 
2007. Letters were sent to the Chairpersons, and nine companies responded positively. Table 
1 presents the sample in terms of number and market value compared to total number and 
market value of listed companies in Norway. 
Insert table 1 here 
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  The choice to use standardized open-ended questionnaires was made based on the  
advantage it represents when performing analysis (Patton 2002:346), but also because  it was 
considered important to increase the focus of the interviews, using the time as efficiently as 
possible. The choice of interviewees was influenced by certain characteristics of the 
Norwegian system of influencing composition of boards.  In companies with more than 200 
employees, the employees have the right to elect 1/3 of the board members.  According to 
prevailing regulations for Norwegian listed companies (The Public Company Act),  both 
women and men should be represented on boards in listed companies, each with at least 40% 
(§ 6-11a). Based on this information several categories of board members were selected to be 
included in the sample.  The Chairperson was selected for her/his overall responsibility for 
board task performance.  The employee-elected board member was selected based on the fact 
that he/she is not elected by the general meeting. Given the requirement of 40 % gender 
representation, one woman in each board was selected (these interviewees also met the 
conditions of independent board members identified in the Norwegian Code). Interviewing 
different categories enabled analysis at individual board member level, analysis per company, 
and analysis across companies as illustrated in table 2. However, in this research, the lowest 
level of analysis is company level. 
 
Insert table 2 about here 
Differences in perceptions among the interviewees regarding the evaluation process 
were identified, enabling gap analysis to be performed and to introduce possible reasons why 
these gaps exist. From this, an actual model of board evaluation at company level was 
identified. Given that evaluation processes were similar across companies, an aggregated 
model of the board evaluation process in Norwegian listed companies could be identified. 
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Characteristics of this model were compared with the characteristics of the board evaluation 
process identified in the literature, making it possible to assess if board evaluation in large 
Norwegian listed companies measures board effectiveness. 
Results   
Factors influencing the decision to perform board evaluations. 
Based on analysis, all companies implemented board evaluation as a consequence of the 
recommendation in the Norwegian Code, as expressed by one of the chairpersons:  
“It’s primarily to follow the recommendations, and it has given some useless 
information and also some things that, of course, I think are… ok” (Chairperson, or CP).  
Purpose of the evaluation 
The analyses show that no clear purpose of the board evaluation is decided. Between two and 
four different purposes were identified within each board. Many chairpersons indicate 
“development” or ”improvement” as the purpose, without giving any  explanation as to which 
area(s) of the board’s work this refers to, or how expected performance was identified: 
“I would say it more generally that it’s quite simply a chance to evaluate and improve 
our efforts” (CP).  
This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all but one board member stated that 
no discussions regarding purpose had been undertaken:  
“We received the questionnaire by mail, and there was no further communication than 
that” (Employee-Elected Board Member, or EEBM). 
Directors perceive board evaluations as serving several purposes, where benchmarking 
was identified as an important additional purpose to development. Several interviewees 
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indicated that the expected level of performance is related to what other boards do as 
indicated by the following quote:  
“No, we are not there, not with goals and such. We like to see where we are, 
compared to others” (CP) 
Object of the evaluation  
The object of all of the implemented board evaluations was the collective board. None of the 
boards conducted an individual evaluation, nor did they evaluate sub-committees. 
Content of the board evaluation 
All interviewees perceive the content to be more comprehensive than what one would expect 
given the perceived purpose, indicating that the content of the board evaluation has been 
developed separately from the purpose. If there is a link between purpose and content of the 
board evaluation, it is too unclear for the board members to identify as indicated by the 
following statement:   
“…..you have so terribly many questions, and that makes for a rather unfocused 
evaluation” (Independent Board Member or BM, all women directors). 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that board members are unaware of how the content 
was developed:   
“I’m sure we took it from another company, or we usually do it by people from 
different boards bringing what they have and then we mix it all together” (CP). 
The evaluator 
 An external evaluator was chosen by 33 percent of the companies.  The choice of evaluator is 
not linked to the possibility it gives for objectivity or to design a system which fits the 
purpose, as identified through the following statements:.  
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 “So in this company we have chosen to do this on a more primitive basis and by 
ourselves. (CP)  
“I don’t think we have used an external consultant, and I believe the board functions 
so well, have such confidence in each other, so we don’t need any help to achieve this.” 
(IBM) 
 “It was the Chairperson who introduced a model that he had tested in other boards, 
and that he thought worked well” (EEBM).  
  However, 47.5 percent of board members not currently using external evaluators 
would prefer this, indicating that an external evaluator is closely related to external 
accountability issues. 
Modality used in the evaluation 
The main method used is a quantitative survey where the individual board members evaluate 
the board collectively by giving scores (Between 1-5) to given statements regarding the 
board’s work. Although a quantitative approach is used, board members within the same 
board disagree on what score constitutes expected performance:  
 “It all depends on what you measure” (IBM1).  
 “(What is goal achievement?) 3 and 4 if you are satisfied. 5 is very good” (IBM2). 
Follow-up 
The studied boards have not implemented any procedure for follow-up of the results, as 
indicated by these quotes:  
 “After it has been presented at the board meeting, I can’t recall that we have done 
anything special with it. …….. There haven’t been any flashing red lights, so there has been 
no need to spend any resources on this” (EEBM). 
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 “There have been some years where we have been so satisfied that there wasn’t much 
to follow up… (CP). 
Discussion 
Based on analysis, certain characteristics of the board evaluation process in Norwegian listed 
companies can be identified and used as indicators of level of board effectiveness. All 
companies conducted board evaluations once a year as recommended in the Norwegian Code, 
indicating that board evaluations are performed to conform to content or context. 
 Little effort has been made in designing a board evaluation process with a clear 
purpose and a system which might fit the purpose. Board evaluation is designed based on a 
wish to implement a simple, short, and inexpensive process. Given that the clearest purpose 
was benchmarking, this indicates that evaluations are performed to conform to context.   
The object of the evaluation is the board collectively. As indicated in the literature review, 
board effectiveness cannot be addressed thoroughly without also evaluating individual 
directors (Conger 2002).  The Norwegian Code also recommends that boards should evaluate 
performance and composition of boards collectively and of individual directors (NUES 2012). 
Given that boards only evaluate the board collectively, this indicates that board evaluations 
are performed to perform to context.   
 Choices regarding evaluator, content and method are made separately from the purpose and 
are influenced by other factors than objectivity. As indicated in the literature, it is important 
that there is a link between what the board evaluation is actually assessing and what it should 
assess in an objective, focused, fast and actionable way. The main focus in the analysis was to 
establish to what extent interviewees perceived content aligned with their perceived purpose 
in order to find indications that could support that a link existed. However, based on the fact 
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that no clear purpose is identified (other than benchmarking), no link between purpose and 
content exists, indicating that board evaluations are performed to conform to context.  
It appears that, although the choice regarding methods is related to the ability to measure 
expected board performance, the level of expected performance has not been identified other 
than as benchmarking against other boards. Based on this, indications suggest that board 
evaluations are performed to conform to context.  
Analyses show that no follow-up procedures have been implemented, indicating that board 
evaluations are performed to conform to context. 
Table 3 below summarizes the findings: 
Insert table 3 Summary of findings about here 
Strong indications have been identified to suggest that board evaluations in Norwegian 
large listed companies are performed to conform to context. Not one indication has been 
shown that board evaluations measure board performance, and there are weak indications to 
suggest that board evaluations are performed to conform to content. This conclusion is 
supported by the following quote:  
We feel we have an obligation to do that, because it is stated in the recommendation 
and if we don’t do it, we must come up with a good explanation as to why not, God knows 
what that explanation would look like” (CP). 
Resource dependency theory (Stiles and Taylor 2001), and Institutional theory (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977) can offer some explanation regarding the implemented board evaluation 
process in Norwegian large listed companies.  Boards perform board evaluations because 
there is external pressure to do this. By seeking links with its environment, the board tries to 
regulate interdependence in terms of reducing uncertainty and transaction costs associated 
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with this dependency. The choice not to conduct the board evaluation might create such an 
uncertainty, as indicated by the above comment from the chairperson.  However, the 
implemented board evaluation process may be characterized as a process where designing a 
process is the goal, which is performed to conform to context.  Analyses show that board 
members have little knowledge about the rationale behind the developed board evaluation 
process, and little possibility to influence it. Regardless, they are very satisfied with the 
implemented process, indicating that board evaluations might represent value creation for 
boards.  Future studies should explore this concept through investigation into the approaches 
individual board members have towards board evaluation. The relative level of board 
effectiveness identified in this research might be explored further by comparing boards that do 
not perform evaluations with board that do.  
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Conformance to content 
Board Performance 
 Conformance to context 
Figure 1: Three levels of accountability 
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Board Composition, board structure, identified tasks, board processes 
Expected task performance  
 
Board evaluation 
Figure 2: Board evaluation as a mechanism to assess board effectiveness 
Actual task performance  
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Figure 3: Elements of a board evaluation process 
Factors influencing the decision to conduct board evaluation 
The board evaluation process: 
 Deciding on a clear purpose 
 Deciding on the object(s) of the board evaluation 
 The content of the evaluation 
 The evaluator 
 The modality to use 
 Follow-up procedure 
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Table 1.  Comparison sampled companies to listed companies Oslo Stock exchange 
 No of 
companies 
%  Total 
number of 
companies  
Oslo Stock 
Exchange 
Market value 
(NOK) 
Market value 
total (NOK) 
% of total 
market 
value 
Sampling 
frame 
21 10 % 1 439 203 617 
 
1 927 208 513 
 
 
74,7 % 
 
Contributing 9 4.3 % 1 269 116 328 
 
1 927 208 513 
 
65,1 % 
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Table 2. Overview of analysis performed 
 
 
 
 
A
n
a
ly
sis a
t co
m
p
a
n
y
 lev
el 
Company 
 
Input 
 
 
S1 
 
 
S2 
 
 
S3 
 
 
S4 
 
 
S5 
 
 
S6 
 
 
S7 
 
 
S8 
 
 
S9 
Chairperson 
 
X X X X  X X X X 
Independent board member X X X XX X X X X X 
Employee-elected board 
member 
X X X X X X  X X 
Evaluation Form X X X  X X X X X 
Analysis across companies 
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Table 3 Summary of findings 
 
 
Level of board 
effectiveness 
 
 
Elements of board 
evaluation process 
 
Board performance 
 
Conforming to 
content 
 
Conforming to 
context 
Factors influencing 
the decision to 
conduct a board 
evaluation  
 X X 
Deciding on 
purpose 
  X 
Object of the 
evaluation 
  X 
Content of the 
evaluation 
  X 
The evaluator  X X 
The modality used   X 
Follow-up   X 
